Oil & Natural Gas — Deep Resource Analysis¶
Disruption Scale¶
Largest supply disruption in global oil market history. 20M bpd normally transits Hormuz, now reduced to a trickle (16 AIS-visible crossings/week vs 100+ daily pre-war).
Oil Production by Country (Pre-War vs Current)¶
| Country | Pre-War (bpd) | Current (March 2026) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia | 11,174,000 | ~8.7-9.0M | -2.0-2.5M (voluntary curtailment) |
| Iraq | 4,448,000 | ~1.5M | -2.9M (-60%) — largest single hit |
| UAE | 4,146,000 | ~3.3-3.6M | -500K-800K (export chokepoint) |
| Kuwait | 2,910,000 | ~2.4M | -500K |
| Iran | 3,129,000 | Volatile | War zone |
| Russia | 9,326,000 | 9,326,000 | Stable — non-Hormuz beneficiary |
| United States | 13,300,000 | 13,300,000 | Stable |
| Brazil | 4,221,000 | 4,221,000 | Stable |
| Canada | 5,576,000 | 5,576,000 | Stable |
Combined Gulf cuts: ~6.7M bpd = ~6% of global supply
Oil Demand & Hormuz Dependency¶
| Country | Consumption (bpd) | Hormuz Dependency | SPR Days |
|---|---|---|---|
| US | 19,000,000 | Low (~10-15%) | N/A (net exporter) |
| China | 16,600,000 | 40% of imports | 100+ days (1.3B bbl) |
| India | 5,400,000 | ~50% via Hormuz | 60 days |
| Japan | ~4,100,000 | 73% via Hormuz | 254-260 days |
| South Korea | ~2,800,000 | >95% of ME oil | 230-240 days |
| EU | 10,500,000 | 25-30% via Hormuz | 90 days minimum |
75% of all Hormuz crude flows go to: China (37.7%), India (14.7%), South Korea (12%), Japan (10.9%)
Pipeline Alternatives to Hormuz¶
| Pipeline | Route | Capacity (bpd) | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Saudi Petroline | Abqaiq → Yanbu (Red Sea) | 7,000,000 | Near-full utilized |
| UAE ADCOP | Habshan → Fujairah (Gulf of Oman) | 1,500,000-1,800,000 | At/near capacity |
| Iraq-Turkey Kirkuk-Ceyhan | Northern Iraq → Mediterranean | 600,000+ | Partially operational |
| IPSA (Iraq-Saudi) | Al-Zubair → Red Sea | 1,650,000 | Non-operational since 1990 |
Maximum bypass: ~10-11M bpd. Structural gap: ~9-10M bpd has NO alternative route.
LNG Trade¶
| Country | Export Capacity (mtpa) | Status |
|---|---|---|
| US | 102.3 | Record; first to exceed 100 mtpa |
| Qatar | ~77 (down from 110) | 17% capacity lost for 3-5 years |
| Australia | ~90 | Stable; 30% Asia market share |
| Russia | ~12 | Sanctioned; limited to China |
Qatar force majeure: Ras Laffan struck March 2 & 18-19. 12.8 mtpa offline. $20B/year revenue loss. Affects Italy, Belgium, South Korea, China.
Price Trajectory¶
| Date | Brent | Event |
|---|---|---|
| Feb 27 | ~$72 | Pre-war |
| Mar 8 | >$100 | First time in 4 years |
| Mar 11-15 | ~$126 | Peak |
| Mar 23 | $100-110 | After Trump pause |
35% surge in single week — largest gain in futures history since 1983.
Price Elasticity & Demand Destruction¶
| Price Level | Impact | Recession Probability |
|---|---|---|
| $80-100 | Manageable | <20% |
| $100-120 | "Really starts to bite" | 30-40% |
| $120-140 | Recession trigger | 60%+ |
| $140+ | Severe shock, stagflation | >75% |
Key finding: Rate of change matters more than absolute level. $20-54/bbl spike in 22 days hits historical recession-trigger velocity.
Historical Comparison¶
| Crisis | Supply Loss | Price Change | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1973 OPEC embargo | ~7% | +300% | 5-6 months |
| 1979 Iranian Revolution | ~4% | +100-150% | 12-18 months |
| 1990 Gulf War | ~7% | +100% | 9 months |
| 2026 Iran War | ~6% → growing | +50% | Ongoing (3+ weeks) |
Unique: Fastest escalation to $100+ in modern history. Dual shock (oil AND gas). No spare OPEC capacity to offset.
Sources¶
IEA Oil Market Report March 2026, EIA, Goldman Sachs, CNBC, Wikipedia (2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis), Visual Capitalist, World Population Review — March 2026