China-Taiwan Window — Cascade Analysis¶

Date: March 24, 2026 (Day 24 of conflict) Classification: Highest-consequence second-order effect of the Iran War Confidence level: Mixed — high confidence on force disposition and vulnerability data; moderate on Chinese intent; low on probability of kinetic action

Why This Matters¶

Multiple cascade chains in this project converge on a single question: does the Iran War create a window for Chinese action against Taiwan? This is not a resource cascade or an industry cascade — it is a strategic cascade where the compounding effects of US overextension, munitions depletion, missile defense redeployment, and allied weakness create a moment of maximum vulnerability for the Indo-Pacific status quo.

If China exploits this window with even a partial blockade of Taiwan, the semiconductor crisis already modeled in /industries/semiconductors-ai.md and /cascades/combinatorial-matrix.md escalates from a supply shock into a civilizational chokepoint. The Iran War becomes a footnote to the main event.

Part 1: The US Force Disposition Problem¶

What Has Been Diverted to the Middle East¶

As of March 16, 2026, the USNI Fleet Tracker shows the following carrier strike groups committed to Operation Epic Fury:

Asset	Location	Previous Assignment
USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) + CSG-3	Arabian Sea	Was operating in Indo-Pacific
USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) + CSG-12	Red Sea (transited Suez March 5)	Atlantic/European theater
USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77)	Completing COMPTUEX, expected to deploy to ME	Atlantic

Remaining in Pacific: USS George Washington (CVN-73) at Yokosuka, Japan — the only carrier strike group in the Western Pacific. USS Tripoli (LHA-7) amphibious assault ship operating in the Philippine Sea.

A Taiwan contingency typically requires at least three carrier strike groups with 30+ surface combatants and 20+ nuclear attack submarines, positioned roughly 1,000 km east of Guam (Defense Priorities, 2025). As of March 24, 2026, the US has one carrier in the Pacific and two to three committed to the Middle East.

Missile Defense Stripped from Asia¶

The redeployment is not limited to carriers:

THAAD redeployed from South Korea to the Middle East in early March 2026. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung publicly objected but admitted Seoul "cannot stop Washington" (CNBC, March 10, 2026).
Patriot PAC-3 interceptors pulled from Indo-Pacific to replenish stocks consumed at extraordinary rates — 800+ Patriot missiles fired in the first 3 days of the war (from /resources/munitions.md).
South Korea's air defense against North Korean ballistic missiles is now visibly degraded.

The Tomahawk Crisis¶

The US Navy expended approximately 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles in 72 hours during Operation Epic Fury — roughly 10% of the entire US inventory in three days (19FortyFive, Breaking Defense, March 2026). Current production: 90-100 per year. Time to produce one Tomahawk: up to two years. RTX contracts aim to boost to 1,000/year, but that capacity does not exist yet.

A Taiwan Strait contingency could exhaust the remaining Tomahawk inventory in days. China is watching — Asia Times reported in March 2026 that "China is watching as US missile stocks drain over Iran."

Submarine Availability¶

The Pacific Fleet commands 29 SSNs, 8 SSBNs, and 2 SSGNs on paper. In a Taiwan contingency, analysts estimate 5 submarines could be on station within 48 hours and perhaps 10 within the first week. But the overall US attack submarine fleet is shrinking toward a trough of ~46 boats by 2030, well below the 66-SSN target. Some Pacific-assigned boats have been diverted to support Middle East operations or are in maintenance.

Bottom line: The US military posture for a Taiwan contingency is at its weakest point since the pivot to Asia was announced in 2012.

Part 2: China's Military Readiness¶

PLA Capabilities (as of March 2026)¶

Capability	Status
Active military personnel	2+ million (vs Taiwan's 170,000)
Defense budget (official)	$275 billion (+7% YoY); real spending estimated $304-377B by Pentagon
Navy size	World's largest by hull count; 3 aircraft carriers (including Fujian with EMALS catapult)
Amphibious Combined Arms Brigades	6 total: 4 under Eastern Theater Command, 2 under Southern Theater Command
Type 076 LHD "Sichuan"	40,000+ ton drone carrier with electromagnetic catapult; sea trials began 2026; PLA Navy delivery expected by end of 2026
Rocket Force	Leading hypersonic missile arsenal globally; DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles
Air Force	J-20 stealth fighters operational; 1,700+ ADIZ incursions in 2024 (up from 910 in 2023)
Recent exercises	"Justice Mission 2025" (Dec 29-30, 2025): 14 warships, 14 Coast Guard vessels, amphibious assault group, 130+ aircraft, 27 rockets — full blockade rehearsal

Readiness Constraints¶

Despite these capabilities, serious constraints remain:

Corruption purges: Multiple top PLA generals arrested in 2024-2025, potentially degrading command cohesion and equipment reliability.
Amphibious logistics gap: Most analysts assess a full-scale amphibious invasion as unlikely before 2027-2030 due to logistics and training shortfalls. The PLA has never conducted a contested amphibious landing at scale.
Lessons from Iran: The PLA is studying how US decapitation strikes failed to eliminate Iranian resistance — this is cautionary for PLA planners contemplating Taiwan operations (from /countries/china.md).
21st Party Congress: Scheduled for fall 2027. Xi needs absolute stability in the run-up. A failed Taiwan operation would be regime-threatening.

The Key Intelligence Assessment¶

US intelligence, as of March 19, 2026, assesses that China is not committed to a 2027 Taiwan invasion timeline (USNI News). However, this assessment was issued before the full extent of US munitions depletion and force diversion became apparent.

Part 3: Taiwan's Compounding Vulnerabilities¶

The Iran War does not merely distract the US — it directly degrades Taiwan's position through multiple channels simultaneously:

Energy¶

11 days of LNG reserves at normal consumption (from /cascades/combinatorial-matrix.md). LNG provides ~50% of Taiwan's electricity.
Qatar's Ras Laffan strike (March 2) took 17% of global LNG capacity offline for 3-5 years. Taiwan's LNG supply is already under strain.
A 50% reduction in Taiwan's grid capacity would force a "Sophie's Choice" between hospitals/homes and TSMC/UMC semiconductor fabs (FDD, November 2025).
Taiwan has no nuclear power (phased out), lagging renewables, and is cutting coal — maximum LNG dependence at maximum LNG vulnerability.

Semiconductors¶

Helium shortage (33% global supply offline) already constraining TSMC operations (from /resources/helium.md). Critical threshold: 2-3 weeks into shortage, fabs see measurable constraints — that clock hits now (late March 2026).
Bromine (67% at risk from Israeli supply disruption) threatens PCB production.
TSMC consumes 10% of Taiwan's total electricity — in a blockade scenario, something has to give.

Military¶

Patriot/THAAD systems that might have been available for Taiwan defense are now in the Middle East.
US munitions stocks depleted — the weapons that would be used to sink a Chinese invasion fleet are the same Tomahawks being fired at Iran.
Taiwan's own military: 170,000 troops vs China's 2+ million. Force ratio roughly 12:1 against.

Diplomatic¶

US attention and diplomatic bandwidth consumed by Iran ceasefire negotiations.
Japan weakened: SPR crisis point projected Sept-Oct 2026 (from /simulation/master-simulation.md); THAAD/Patriot stripped; economy under energy price pressure.
Europe irrelevant — dealing with its own energy crisis for the second time in four years.

Part 4: Xi Jinping's Decision Calculus¶

Arguments FOR Action During This Window¶

Factor	Assessment
US carrier availability	Lowest since pivot to Asia — 1 CSG in Pacific vs standard 2-3
US missile stocks	10%+ of Tomahawk inventory expended; Patriot/SM-6 stocks depleted
US missile defense in Asia	THAAD removed from South Korea; Patriot interceptors pulled
Trump's Taiwan commitment	Perceived as lowest of any recent US president (Foreign Affairs, Yun Sun, Jan 2026)
Taiwan energy vulnerability	11-day LNG reserves already under strain from global disruption
Allied readiness	Japan weakened; Australia lacks force projection capability; AUKUS submarines not yet delivered
SMIC advantage	Advancing to 3nm while Samsung/SK Hynix face helium/bromine crisis — China's chip disadvantage is narrowing
Global attention	World focused on Iran; media, intelligence, diplomatic bandwidth consumed

Arguments AGAINST Action¶

Factor	Assessment
Mediator positioning	China's "active neutral" role in Iran war gives it Gulf influence, yuan-for-oil, and Global South credibility. Taiwan action destroys this overnight
Economic risk	Even a limited blockade triggers massive sanctions; China's economy already struggling with property crisis, deflation, weak domestic demand
Invasion readiness	PLA logistics/training gaps remain real; corruption purges degraded readiness; no contested amphibious experience
Failure consequences	A failed invasion ends Xi's political career and potentially CCP legitimacy. Foreign Policy (Jan 2026): "A failed Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be disastrous for Xi Jinping"
21st Party Congress	Fall 2027 — Xi needs stability, not a war whose outcome is uncertain
Cost estimates	A Taiwan war could cost China trillions of dollars even if successful; sanctions would dwarf anything imposed on Russia
Galvanizing effect	Taiwan action would instantly unite US domestic politics, NATO, and the Quad in a way that Iran hasn't
Nuclear escalation risk	US nuclear umbrella over Japan/Korea; any Taiwan conflict risks escalation ladder

The Central Paradox¶

The moment of maximum US military weakness is also the moment when China's diplomatic positioning is most valuable. Attacking Taiwan while brokering an Iran peace deal would be the most strategically incoherent decision in modern Chinese history. The mediator-to-aggressor pivot would unite the entire world against Beijing in hours.

This is the strongest argument against kinetic action. But it does not apply to sub-kinetic coercion.

Part 5: Scenario Spectrum¶

Scenario 1: Gray Zone Escalation (Most Likely — 35-45% probability during war window)¶

What it looks like: Not an invasion or even a declared blockade. China escalates its existing pattern of coast guard intrusions, military exercises, ADIZ violations, and maritime harassment to a qualitatively new level — what CSIS calls a "quarantine."

Mechanics: - China announces "enhanced customs inspection rules" requiring all cargo vessels bound for Taiwan to file advance declarations with Chinese authorities. - Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels increase presence around Taiwan's ports — not blocking, but "inspecting." - PLA conducts another round of large-scale exercises simulating encirclement — building on Justice Mission 2025's blockade rehearsal. - Fishing fleet movements constrain Taiwanese naval operations. - Insurance companies begin adding Taiwan Strait risk premiums (echoing the Hormuz insurance cascade from /resources/shipping-insurance.md). - China violated Taiwan's territorial airspace with a military drone for the first time in January 2026 — establishing new precedents.

Why now: This approach stays below the threshold of armed conflict, avoids triggering a US military response (especially with the US distracted and depleted), preserves China's mediator role in Iran, and imposes real costs on Taiwan's economy and energy security. It's a stress test of an already-stressed system.

What makes it dangerous: If Taiwan's 11-day LNG reserves are already under pressure from the global disruption, even a partial quarantine could tip the energy balance. A 50% reduction in Taiwan's grid = semiconductor production collapses = global chip crisis jumps from "severe" to "catastrophic."

Scenario 2: Energy Blockade / Selective Quarantine (10-15% probability)¶

What it looks like: China uses the cover of the Iran War's energy disruption to selectively interdict Taiwan's LNG imports. Not a military blockade — a "law enforcement" operation, possibly framed as enforcing maritime safety in "Chinese internal waters."

Mechanics: - Coast Guard vessels intercept or delay LNG tankers approaching Taiwan. - Beijing applies diplomatic and economic pressure on LNG exporters and shipping companies to delay Taiwan-bound cargoes. - Insurance costs for Taiwan Strait transit spike — the same mechanism that paralyzed Hormuz shipping now applied to Taiwan. - Taiwan's 11-day LNG reserve clock starts ticking toward zero.

Why it's more likely than invasion: A quarantine is more feasible for China and more likely than an invasion or blockade in the near term (CSIS analysis). It avoids the catastrophic risk of a failed amphibious assault while imposing existential pressure on Taiwan.

Escalation risk: If Taiwan's navy attempts to escort LNG tankers, the situation escalates rapidly. If the US (with one carrier in the Pacific) attempts to break the quarantine, great-power confrontation becomes real.

Scenario 3: Full Military Blockade (3-5% probability)¶

What it looks like: Declared exclusion zone around Taiwan. PLA Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force enforce a complete blockade of all maritime and air traffic.

Why unlikely in this window: Too escalatory. Destroys mediator positioning. Risks military confrontation with a nuclear-armed adversary even if depleted. PLA logistics still uncertain. Party Congress timing wrong. Economic self-harm from semiconductor destruction.

Scenario 4: Amphibious Invasion (1-2% probability in 2026)¶

What it looks like: Full-scale cross-strait assault — the "bolt from the blue" scenario.

Why extremely unlikely: Every serious analyst puts full invasion probability in the low single digits for 2026. PLA amphibious capability is improving but not yet sufficient for a contested 100-mile strait crossing against a defended island. The corruption purges degraded readiness. The cost of failure is regime-ending for Xi. US intelligence as of March 2026 assesses China is not committed to this timeline.

Part 6: The Silicon Shield — Deterrent or Target?¶

The Theory¶

Taiwan produces over 90% of the world's most advanced semiconductors through TSMC. This creates mutual deterrence: China would not destroy the fabs it depends on, and the world would intervene to protect them.

Why the Shield Is Weakening¶

SMIC is catching up: 5nm achieved with Huawei (multi-patterning, no EUV). 3nm tape-out targeted 2026. China's dependency on TSMC for cutting-edge chips is decreasing (from /countries/china.md).
TSMC is diversifying out: Japan Kumamoto fab, Arizona fab, potential European fab. Each fab built outside Taiwan reduces the island's indispensability.
The Iran War is proving it: Helium shortage + LNG vulnerability already degrading TSMC output. The war demonstrates that Taiwan's fabs can be disrupted without anyone touching Taiwan directly.
A blockade doesn't destroy fabs: It starves them of energy and inputs. China could argue it's "preserving" the fabs while the island comes to terms. The fabs go dark from lack of LNG, not from Chinese missiles.
Credibility gap: The NSA estimates TSMC destruction would cost $1+ trillion globally. But would the US risk nuclear war over semiconductors? Beijing may calculate this threat lacks credibility, especially with a president perceived as indifferent to Taiwan (MIT Technology Review, August 2025).

The 2027-2032 Vulnerability Window¶

The most dangerous period is the convergence of: Chinese military readiness improving, partial Chinese semiconductor self-sufficiency achieved (SMIC), and continued Western dependence on Taiwan. During this window, the silicon shield is at its weakest deterrent value (ISDP analysis). The Iran War may have pulled this window forward.

Part 7: Historical Precedent Analysis¶

Crisis	Year	Parallel	Outcome	Lesson for 2026
Suez / Hungary	1956	Britain/France distracted by Suez → USSR crushed Hungarian uprising unopposed	Soviet tanks entered Budapest while UN focused on Egypt	A crisis in one theater does enable aggression in another. The divided West could not respond. Direct parallel to Iran War / Taiwan.
Yom Kippur War	1973	Middle East war → Soviet threat to intervene → DEFCON 3 nuclear alert	Near-nuclear confrontation between superpowers during regional war	Middle East wars can trigger great-power escalation dynamics far beyond the original theater.
Falklands	1982	Argentina miscalculated that Britain was distracted and in decline → invaded	Britain retook the islands at great cost; Argentine junta fell	Miscalculation of a distracted power's resolve can be catastrophic for the aggressor. Caution for China.
Iraq 2003 / North Korea	2003	US committed to Iraq → North Korea withdrew from NPT, accelerated nuclear program	North Korea achieved nuclear weapons during US Middle East distraction	Secondary actors exploit great-power distraction not through invasion but through irreversible capability gains. Most relevant model for China's likely behavior.
Russia / Georgia	2008	Russia invaded Georgia during Beijing Olympics / US election year	Five-day war; Western response was rhetorical only	Timing matters. Adversaries act when political constraints on the defender are highest.

Most likely historical model for China's behavior: Not Suez/Hungary (invasion during distraction) but Iraq/North Korea (accelerate irreversible capability gains while the adversary is committed elsewhere). China uses the window to advance SMIC, stockpile resources, conduct exercises, and establish new gray zone precedents — not to invade.

Part 8: The November 2026 Convergence¶

This analysis connects to the project's identified "November 2026 convergence" — the moment when multiple independent pressure vectors peak simultaneously.

Converging Pressures (September-November 2026)¶

Pressure	Timeline	Mechanism
Gallium/germanium suspension expires	November 27, 2026	China can reinstate export controls on materials critical to Western chip production and weapons guidance systems. 99% gallium, 83% germanium.
US midterm elections	November 5, 2026	Maximum domestic political constraint on military action. War fatigue. Cost-of-living anger.
Japan SPR crisis	Sept-Oct 2026	Japan's strategic petroleum reserves approach critical thresholds. Japan — the single most important Taiwan contingency ally — is weakened.
European winter energy crisis	Oct-Dec 2026	European gas storage potentially inadequate after Qatar LNG loss. Europe has zero bandwidth for Pacific crisis.
US munitions trough	Q3-Q4 2026	12-18 months to rebuild Tomahawk, Patriot, SM-6 stocks. Maximum depletion point.
TSMC summer stress	July-Aug 2026	Helium + LNG + summer electricity demand = maximum fab vulnerability. Lingering into fall.
PLA Type 076 delivery	Late 2026	New 40,000-ton drone carrier amphibious assault ship enters service.

The Maximum Leverage Scenario¶

In November 2026, China could simultaneously: 1. Reinstate gallium/germanium controls — crippling Western chip production and weapons supply chains. 2. Escalate gray zone operations around Taiwan — during US post-midterm political transition, with depleted munitions, while Japan is energy-weakened and Europe is in winter crisis. 3. Leverage mediator position in Iran — threatening to withdraw diplomatic support for ceasefire unless concessions on Taiwan, trade, or technology. 4. Demand US concessions — on chip export controls, sanctions, trade policy, with the credible threat that non-compliance leads to resource weaponization.

This is not a military invasion scenario. It is a coercive leverage scenario where China's resource dominance, diplomatic positioning, and the US's self-inflicted military weakness converge to create maximum pressure without firing a shot.

This may be the most consequential second-order effect of the Iran War: not that China invades Taiwan, but that the war creates conditions where China can extract strategic concessions that permanently shift the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

Part 9: Indicators and Warning Signs¶

Tier 1: Imminent Crisis (hours to days)¶

[ ] PLA mobilization orders detected; large-scale troop movements to Eastern/Southern Theater Commands
[ ] Civilian ferry requisitioning for military use (dual-use vessels capable of transporting tanks)
[ ] Chinese civilian shipping diverted away from Taiwan Strait
[ ] Massive cyber attacks on Taiwanese financial systems, power grids, communications
[ ] Blood bank stockpiling in coastal Chinese provinces (Fujian, Zhejiang, Guangdong)
[ ] Social media censorship spike; patriotic mobilization messaging
[ ] Chinese nationals recalled from Taiwan
[ ] Rocket Force deployment to launch positions visible on satellite

Tier 2: Elevated Risk (days to weeks)¶

[ ] PLA exercises near Taiwan exceeding Justice Mission 2025 scale (14 warships, 130+ aircraft)
[ ] Coast Guard presence around Taiwan increases beyond current baseline
[ ] Insurance companies add Taiwan Strait war-risk premiums
[ ] LNG tankers delayed or rerouted from Taiwan-bound cargoes
[ ] China increases rhetoric on "reunification timeline"
[ ] ADIZ incursions spike above the 2024 baseline of ~1,700/year
[ ] Fishing fleet concentrations near Taiwan's approaches
[ ] PLA logistics movements: fuel, ammunition, medical supplies toward coastal staging areas
[ ] Increased Chinese submarine activity in the Philippine Sea and Luzon Strait

Tier 3: Strategic Positioning (weeks to months)¶

[ ] SMIC capacity expansion announcements (reducing dependence on TSMC)
[ ] Chinese stockpiling of critical commodities beyond normal levels
[ ] Diplomatic pressure on Taiwan's remaining allies
[ ] Increased disinformation campaigns targeting Taiwan's public morale
[ ] PLA exercises incorporating "quarantine" or "customs inspection" scenarios
[ ] Economic preparation: insulating Chinese financial system from potential sanctions
[ ] Freezing or repatriation of Chinese assets held abroad

Current Status (March 24, 2026)¶

Tier 1: No indicators detected. Tier 2: Partially active — Coast Guard presence elevated since January 2026; first-ever drone airspace violation (January 2026); increased military budget (+7%); rhetoric escalated during Two Sessions (March 12). Tier 3: Active — SMIC advancing rapidly; military modernization continuing; gray zone operations normalizing; PLA studying Iran War lessons.

Assessment: We are in a Tier 3 / early Tier 2 environment. The structural conditions for coercion are building. The conditions for kinetic action are not present.

Part 10: Probability Assessment¶

Aggregate Probabilities (During Iran War Window, March-December 2026)¶

Scenario	Probability	Confidence	Key Dependency
Gray zone escalation (intensified exercises, drone incursions, coast guard harassment)	35-45%	Moderate	Already happening; question is pace of escalation
Energy quarantine / selective interdiction of Taiwan LNG	10-15%	Low	Requires China to sacrifice mediator role; depends on war duration
Full military blockade	3-5%	Low	Only if war extends past summer and US is visibly unable to respond
Amphibious invasion	1-2%	Moderate	Extremely unlikely in 2026 regardless of Iran War
Coercive leverage play (November convergence)	25-35%	Moderate-High	Non-kinetic; uses resource/diplomatic weapons rather than military force

What Would Change These Probabilities¶

Probabilities increase if: - Iran War extends into frozen conflict (Scenario B from /simulation/scenarios-and-opportunities.md) through summer/fall - US deploys a third carrier to the Middle East, leaving Pacific with zero CSGs - Additional Patriot/THAAD systems pulled from Asia - Taiwan suffers an energy crisis from the Ras Laffan LNG disruption independent of Chinese action - US midterm results signal war fatigue and isolationism - Xi faces internal pressure on Taiwan from PLA hardliners

Probabilities decrease if: - Iran War reaches negotiated wind-down by April-May (Scenario A) and US forces redeploy - US explicitly reaffirms Taiwan commitment with credible force positioning - China achieves its "broker the peace" objective and the diplomatic payoff outweighs Taiwan coercion - TSMC Arizona fab reaches production milestones, reducing Taiwan's strategic centrality - Japan and Australia credibly demonstrate readiness for Taiwan contingency

Part 11: Implications for the Simulation¶

If Gray Zone Escalation Materializes¶

This is already partially priced into the chip crisis modeled in /cascades/combinatorial-matrix.md and /industries/semiconductors-ai.md. Additional insurance costs for Taiwan Strait transit would compound the Hormuz insurance cascade. DRAM/NAND prices, already at +171% YoY, could spike further on Taiwan risk premium. The AI Winter Risk cascade (Cascade #4 in the combinatorial matrix) intensifies.

If Energy Quarantine Materializes¶

This is not modeled anywhere in the current simulation and would represent the most severe escalation scenario: - Taiwan's 11-day LNG reserve → grid crisis → TSMC goes dark - Global advanced chip production drops 60-80% (TSMC + Samsung/SK Hynix already helium-constrained) - Memory prices: effectively unpriced - AI buildout: not delayed 6-12 months but potentially 2-3 years - Every industry dependent on advanced semiconductors enters crisis: automotive, defense, telecommunications, medical devices, consumer electronics - Economic impact: potentially $2-5 trillion in GDP destruction on top of Iran War losses - Nuclear escalation risk: US faces decision on whether to confront China militarily with depleted forces

Connection to Other Cascade Files¶

This analysis has dependencies on and implications for: - /cascades/combinatorial-matrix.md — The Meta-Cascade (China's Position) section needs updating if gray zone escalation materializes - /simulation/master-simulation.md — Phase 3 ("The Structural Reckoning") underweights Taiwan risk - /simulation/scenarios-and-opportunities.md — Scenario C (Asymmetric Escalation) does not model a simultaneous Taiwan crisis - /blind-spots/analysis.md — This was previously flagged as a gap; this file begins to address it - /resources/shipping-insurance.md — Insurance cascade model applies to Taiwan Strait with different parameters - /industries/semiconductors-ai.md — TSMC vulnerability section needs to incorporate quarantine scenarios

Sources¶

Force Disposition and Military¶

China Military Capability¶

Taiwan Vulnerability and Silicon Shield¶

Xi's Calculus and Strategic Assessment¶

Blockade and Quarantine Scenarios¶

Allied Response¶

Two-Front War and Strategic Context¶

Historical Parallels¶

Project Internal References¶

/cascades/combinatorial-matrix.md — Chip Famine cascade, Meta-Cascade (China)
/countries/china.md — SMIC advantage, military lessons, gallium/germanium leverage
/industries/semiconductors-ai.md — TSMC vulnerability, triple input crisis
/resources/helium.md — 33% supply offline, fab impact timeline
/resources/munitions.md — Burn rate, production bottlenecks
/simulation/master-simulation.md — Phase 3 deterrence gap
/simulation/scenarios-and-opportunities.md — November 2026 convergence, Scenario B/C
/simulation/russia-china-incentives.md — China's ideal outcome: broker the peace